
















IS THERE REALLY A FOREIGN OWNERSHIP WAGE 







Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall 
 



















Postal address: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Office address: Sveavägen 65 
Telephone: +46 8 736 93 60  Telefax: +46 8 31 30 17  E-mail: japan@hhs.se  Internet: 
http://www.hhs.se/eijs 
 
Is There Really a Foreign Ownership Wage Premium? Evidence from 















Numerous studies based on firm-level data have reported higher average wages in 
foreign-owned firms than in domestically-owned firms. This, however, does not 
necessarily imply that the individual worker’s wage increase with foreign ownership. 
Using detailed matched employer-employee data, we examine the effect of foreign 
ownership on individual wages, controlling for individual and firm heterogeneity as 
well as for possible selection bias in foreign acquisitions. We distinguish between 
foreign greenfields and takeovers and compare foreign ownership with both domestic 
multinationals and local firms. Our results indicate that employees in foreign-owned 
firms do not have systematically higher wages than comparable workers in similar 
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  1I. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased dramatically during the last decades 
and has arguably benefited both host and home countries. The former group of 
countries may for instance benefit through inflows of new technology and access to 
foreign markets. An additional benefit could be a positive effect on host country 
wages. It is well established that foreign owned firms pay higher average wages than 
domestically owned firms.
1 Part of this wage premium is caused by foreign firms 
locating in high wage sectors and localities, but the premium exists even within 
industries and regions and after controlling for firm characteristics and the average 
educational level of the labor force. There are several suggestions why foreign firms 
would pay higher wages than domestic firms. For instance, foreign firms might try to 
prevent technological spillovers through labor turnover by paying a wage premium 
(Fosfuri  et al., 2001); the wage premium might be caused by rent-sharing 
arrangements among foreign firms (Budd et al., 2002); by a higher labor demand 
volatility in foreign plants (Fabri et al., 2003); or as compensation for a higher foreign 
closure rate (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003).  
However, although the average wage is relatively high in foreign owned firms, 
it is still unclear if foreign firms pay higher wages for identical workers. Employees 
differ in many respects such as age, education, gender and previous work experience, 
all of which have an impact on wages. It is plausible that the foreign wage premium is 
caused by such characteristics rather than by ownership of the firm. To examine if 
foreign firms pay a relatively high wage for a given quality of employees calls for a 
change in the unit of observation: from the firm or plant level to the individual 
                                                           
1 See e.g. Aitken et al (1996), Doms and Jensen (1998), Conyon et al. (2002), Griffith (1999), Girma et 
al. (2001), Driffield and Girma (2002), Görg et al (2002), Haddad and Harrison, 1993), Lipsey (1994) 
and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002, 2004). The wage differentials between domestically- and foreign-
  2worker. In addition, detailed information on worker characteristics is necessary to 
control for differences in human capital. Such an analysis has previously been 
constrained by a scarcity of data combining information on individual employees with 
information on their employers. A recent study by Martins (2004), using matched 
employer-employee data, finds no effect on individual wages after foreign acquisition 
of Portuguese manufacturing firms.
2  
This paper combines data on all Swedish firms spanning the period 1990-2000 
with a very large sample of more than 2 million Swedish employees covering the 
period 1996-2000. We contribute to the literature in several respects. First, our 
matched employer-employee data enables us to analyze the impact of foreign 
ownership on individual wages, controlling for both firm- and individual 
heterogeneity. In order to control for unobservable firm and individual characteristics 
as well as possible selection bias in foreign acquisitions, we combine matching 
techniques with the more general difference in difference estimator. Second, foreign 
owned firms might enter the market by a greenfield investment or through an 
acquisition of a Swedish owned firm. These two modes of entry might have different 
effects on wages. We therefore compare foreign greenfield investments with foreign 
acquisitions. Third, to isolate the impact of being a multinational firm we compare 
foreign owned firms with both Swedish multinational firms and Swedish local firms.  
Firm level regressions show, in accordance with the previous literature, that 
foreign owned firms pay higher wages than domestically owned firms. This wage 
premium is primarily due to differences between foreign owned firms and Swedish 
local firms, suggesting that multinationality, as such, is what matters. Comparing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
owned firms range from about 10 to 70 percent. See also Lipsey (2004) for a survey of the literature on 
FDI and wages. 
  3greenfields with foreign takeovers indicates that greenfields tend to pay the highest 
wage premium. This is probably driven by the fact that greenfield firms must pay a 
wage premium in order to attract new workers to their firm.  
The estimated wage premium in foreign owned firms is substantially reduced 
as we change from firm- to individual level estimations. Estimating individual wage 
equations yields a coefficient for foreign ownership that is close to zero. Finally, 
results from difference-in-differences estimations show that the individual worker 
wage level is 2-6 percent higher in acquired than in similar non-acquired firms, but 
that the wage growth is lower in acquired firms. This result is verified further by 
fixed-effect estimations suggesting a slightly negative impact on individual wages of 
foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the data 
and provides descriptive statistics. The empirical methodology is presented in Section 
III. The results are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes.  
  
II. Data Sources and Description  
Data 
The analysis is based on three register-based data sets from Statistics Sweden 
collected by the Trade Union Institute for Economic Research (FIEF). First, for the 
period 1996-2000 the financial statistics (FS) contain detailed information on all 
Swedish firms. For the period 1990-1995 we have data on all manufacturing firms 
with at least 20 employees and non-manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees.
3
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 Two other studies that uses matched employer-employee data are Bora and Wooden (1998) and Ono 
and Odaki (2004) who in cross-section studies find individual wages to be relatively high in foreign-
owned firms in Australia and Japan, respectively 
3 For non-manufacturing firms with less than 50 employees we have a stratified random sample. 
  4Examples of variables included are value added, capital stock (book value), number of 
employees, total wages, ownership, profits, and industry sector. A detailed description 
of the variables is found in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. 
Second, the Regional labor market statistics (RAMS) includes data on all 
establishments spanning the period 1990-2000. RAMS add information on the 
composition of the labor force with respect to educational level and demographics.  
Finally, the individual wage statistics database (LS) contains detailed 
information from official registers on a very large representative sample of employed 
individuals. The LS spans the period 1996-2000 and has approximately 2 million 
observations per year, which is roughly 50 percent of the Swedish labor force. 
Examples of variables included are full-time equivalent wages, education, labor 
market experience, gender and type of job. 
The data sets are matched by unique identification codes. The nature of the 
data sets implies that the firm-level estimations will be based on data for 1990-2000, 
while the individual-level analysis is based on our matched employer-employee data 
set for the period 1996-2000.  In our analysis we use firms with at least 20 employees.  
In the firm-level panel between 1990-2000, we restrict our sample to those 
firms that are observed for at least five years. This means that for Swedish firms 
acquired by a foreign owner at period (t), we only consider firms that are Swedish 
owned at (t-1) and remain foreign owned at year (t+1) to (t+3).  
In the individual-level analysis on matched data for 1996-2000 we make 
similar restrictions. For these data we only consider firms that are observed for four 
consecutive years. The same restriction applies to individuals. With this restriction we 
can, in the foreign acquisition part of the paper, study firms that are acquired 1997 or 
1998. We make the same survival criterion for the control group of non-acquired 
  5Swedish firms. As for firms, we restrict individuals to remain in the same firm during 
the period of observation of the firm. This restriction enables us to control for both 
individual and firm-specific effects when analyzing the impact of foreign ownership 
on wages.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
There was a substantial increase of foreign ownership in the Swedish economy during 
the first half of the 1990s. As seen in Figure 1, the foreign share of value added 
increased from about 15 percent in 1990 to about 21 percent in 1996, a share that has 
remained relatively stable since then.  
 
- Figure 1 about here- 
 
The same pattern is seen for the foreign share of employment, although with 
slightly smaller shares, which suggest that labor productivity is higher in foreign 
firms. Finally, the foreign share of the number of firms is substantially smaller, 
showing foreign firm to be larger than the average Swedish-owned firm. The 
increased foreign share of Swedish industry corresponds to similar developments in 
many countries, but it might have been comparably large in Sweden (e.g. OECD, 
2002). There are several reasons for this development. For instance, the deregulation 
of capital and foreign exchange markets in the late 1980s opened up Sweden for 
inflows of FDI. Two other important factors include the Swedish membership in the 
European Union in 1995 and the large currency crisis in 1992. The latter reduced the 
cost of Swedish assets and the cost of locating production in Sweden.  
 
-Table 1 about here.- 
  6 
Table 1 shows a comparison of domestic- and foreign owned firms in Sweden. 
Wages are about 20 percent higher in foreign- as compared to domestically owned 
Swedish firms. Foreign firms locating in high-wage sectors do not seem to cause the 
high foreign wage; foreign firms pay higher wages in all sectors in 1990 and in all 
sectors except in Electronics and Transport Equipment in 2000.  
The higher wages in foreign-owned firms might be caused by firm 
characteristics. For instance, skilled individuals have comparably high wages, and 
large firms tend to pay higher wages than small firms.  Table 1 includes comparison 
of these factors in foreign- and domestically-owned firms. High skill is measured as 
the share of the workforce with at least tertiary education and size as the number of 
employees. Foreign-owned firms have a relatively well-educated workforce; the share 
of workers with higher education is twice as high as in domestically owned firm in 
1990, but decreases to about 70 percent higher in 2000. The pattern of comparable 
skilled workers in foreign-owned firms is found in almost all sectors and in both 
years. Moreover, foreign-owned firms are larger than domestically owned firms, and 
the difference has increased over the period. However, there are differences between 
industries and across the two years.  
   
III. Empirical Set-Up 
Firm-level analysis  
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of ownership on wages at the firm 
level departing from the following expression: 
) 1 ( 2 F 1 0 ln jt j jt jt O jt w ε η β β β + + ′ + + =  
  7where wage is the average wage at firm j at time t. Ownership is captured by O, a 
dummy variable for foreign ownership, defined as 1 if at least 50 percent of the equity 
is foreign owned. We will analyze the stock of foreign owned firms, foreign takeovers 
as well as greenfields.
4 To isolate the impact of multinational status, we compare 
foreign owned firms with both Swedish multinationals and Swedish local firms. A 
firm is classified as being a multinational if they are reporting positive export to other 
firms within the same concern. F is a vector of firm level variables such as (log) firm 
size, profits per employee, capital intensity, export intensity, categorical variables 
capturing the educational level of the employees, share of women, labor productivity 
and industry affiliation,  j η  is fixed firm effects and ε  is the error term.   
 
Individual-level analysis 
We continue with estimates of individual wage equations using the matched panel of 
firms and individuals. Micro data on individuals allows us to take into account within 
firm variation and worker heterogeneity. We use the following empirical specification 
in the individual-level analysis: 
) 2 ( 3 F 2 X 1 0 ln t i j i jt ijt jt O ijt w ε η α β β β β + + + ′ + ′ + + =  
where wit is the full-time equivalent monthly wage for worker i at time t; O is a 
foreign ownership dummy for firm j; X is a vector with individual characteristics 
including gender, education, labor market experience and job-type; and F contains 
firm level variables. Finally, αi and ηj are fixed individual- and firm-effects, 
respectively and εit is the error term. 
 
Propensity score matching 
                                                           
4 We define greenfield investment as a new established firm that is foreign owned. 
  8An econometric problem in estimating the causal effect of foreign ownership on 
wages concerns the endogeneity of firms becoming foreign owned. In other words, it 
is not random which firms that are acquired. Firms that become foreign owned might 
exhibit characteristics that systematically differ from other domestic firms. Moreover, 
and analogous to the problem in the evaluation literature of non-random treatment 
groups, the characteristics of the firms that become foreign owned might be such that 
they in any case would develop differently than their non-acquired counterparts. This, 
in turn, means that estimates on outcome variables (such as wages) become biased. In 
the case of foreign ownership and wages, the non-random sample of foreign firms can 
lead to an upward bias on the effect of foreign ownership on wages. We approach this 
problem by way of propensity score matching combined with the more general 
difference-in-differences (d-i-d) technique.  
The aim of the matching procedure is to find a group of non-acquired firms 
that display the same characteristics as the group of acquired firms. Matching 
techniques allows us to relax the assumption of common coefficients across the total 
sample of acquired and non-acquired firms. Given that coefficients differ across 
groups OLS yields biased estimates. How much of the OLS-bias that is removed by 
the matching depends crucially on the identification of the characteristics that 
determine acquisitions (Heckman et al. (1998), Becker and Ichino (2002)). Table A3 
shows the estimated logit-model of being acquired by a foreign owner, conditional on 
a variety of covariates that are important in explaining acquisitions. We use the 
algorithms provided by Becker and Ichino (2002) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for 
the matching. The propensity score is estimated with the Nearest-Neighbor method 
without replacements. The balancing property of the propensity score is tested and 
  9satisfied in all estimations.
5 Since we have a panel of firms and individuals over time, 
the matching of firms is first calculated year-by-year using lagged covariates. The 
matched firms are then used in the analysis to create a panel of firms and individuals. 
Finally, to evaluate the impact of foreign acquisition we combine the matching 
procedure with difference-in-difference estimations, as suggested by Blundell and 
Costa Dias (2000). Using difference-in-difference estimations allow us to examine the 




We follow the previous literature and start by examining the average level of wages 
per employee at the firm level in Table 2.  
 
-Table 2 about here.- 
 
Estimation 1 shows that wages are 20 percent higher in foreign-owned firms 
compared to wages in domestically owned firms, even after controlling for industry 
and time effects. However, domestic and foreign owned firms differ in several 
respects, which might also affect wages. The rest of the estimations in Table 2 try to 
control for such differences in worker and firm characteristics.  Estimation 2 includes 
characteristics of the workforce that presumably affect wages: the average skill level 
of employees and the share of female workers. Including these characteristics 
increases the R-square value substantially and reduces the wage premium in foreign 
                                                           
5 To test for this, the sample is split into intervals of the propensity score. Within these intervals, the 
algorithm tests that the means of the covariates in the logit do not differ between treated and control 
observations. In testing the balancing property, only observations in the region of common support are 
included. 
  10owned firms to about 12 percent. This means that the impact of foreign ownership on 
wages can to a large extent be explained by worker characteristics, suggesting that it 
is important to control for worker heterogeneity. Moreover, a high share of female 
workers decreases average wages and a high share of high-skilled workers has a 
positive, albeit small, effect on average wages.
6 Estimation 3 includes a set of other 
firm characteristics that in previous studies have been found to affect wages. Large 
firms pay relatively high wages, as do capital-intensive firms. The coefficient for 
profits per employee is positive and statistically significant but of rather small size.  
In model 4, both human-capital and firm characteristics are included. The 
estimated coefficient on the foreign ownership variable of 0.12 is identical to the one 
in column 2, indicating that employee characteristics are more important than firm 
characteristics in explaining the foreign wage premium.  
Models 5 and 6 compare foreign-owned firms with domestically-owned 
multinationals and local firms. The results show that the difference is much smaller 
between foreign-owned and domestically-owned multinationals than between foreign-
owned and local firms. Hence, a large part of the difference in wages between 
foreign- and domestically-owned firms is explained by multinational status alone.
7 
Finally, estimation 7 includes a number of other factors that might affect wages: the 
firm’s export orientation, the degree of market competition and labor productivity. 
Export and productivity have statistically significant coefficients but the economic 
significance is small. Including all control variables in estimation 7 reduces the wage 
premium in foreign owned firms from 12 to about 11 percent, which is broadly in line 
with estimates in previous studies on firm level data for developed countries.
8  
                                                           
6 The group of comparison for the two skill variables are workers with intermediate skills (education). 
7 See Dorms and Jensen (1998) and Bellak (2004) for a similar discussion. 
8 See footnotes 1 and 2 for references. 
  11Foreign firms might enter in Sweden either by setting up a greenfield 
investment or by acquiring an existing Swedish-owned firm. It may not be obvious 
why a foreign acquisition should raise wages for workers that are already employed in 
the firm but a greenfield investor must attract new workers to the firm. One way to 
attract workers is to offer higher wages. Moreover, a greenfield investor might pay a 
wage premium due to a lack of knowledge about the local labor market. In Table 3, 
we present wage regressions where foreign ownership has been divided into 
greenfield investments and foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. An additional benefit 
with this distinction is that using information on foreign takeovers allows us to 
examine the impact of ownership change. If high wages in foreign owned firms were 
caused by unobservable firm specific characteristics, rather than by ownership itself, 
we would not expect any statistical significant effect of foreign takeovers.  
 
-Table 3 about here.- 
 
 The wage premium of foreign greenfield investments is similar to the overall 
effect of foreign ownership on wages while the foreign acquisition premium is well 
below the greenfield estimates. To be precise, greenfield investors pay about 11 
percent higher wages than domestically-owned Swedish firms, 5 percent higher than 
Swedish MNEs and 13 percent higher than Swedish locally-owned firms. The 
corresponding numbers for acquisitions are 7, 2 and 8 percent. Hence, the effect of 
foreign takeovers is only about 50 percent to two third as high as the effect of 
greenfield investments.
9
                                                           
9 One reason for observing higher wage in foreign greenfield investments than in foreign takeovers 
could be due to a difference in the experience of the employees. However, controlling for the age of the 
firms did not have any significant impact on the results.  
  12We have also estimated firm-fixed effect models to take into account 
unobservable effects. Including firm fixed-effects further reduces the coefficient for 
foreign takeover to 1-2 percent, depending on specification. Comparing foreign 
takeovers with Swedish multinationals give rise to a non-significant effect (see 
column 6). Again, this stresses the importance in separating between domestic 
multinationals and domestic local firms. 
 
Individual-level Analysis 
As discussed above, there are reasons why an analysis at the individual level rather 
than at the firm level is suitable when studying the effect of ownership on wages. In 
Table 4 we present results from estimating individual wage equations. 
 
-Table 4 about here.- 
 
One striking result is that the firm level estimates differ radically from the 
corresponding individual level estimation. The estimated wage premium in foreign 
owned firms is substantially reduced when we change from firm level to individual 
level estimations. To be precise, estimation 1 in Table 4 shows that the unconditional 
wage premium is around 4 percent but the premium decreases to about 3 percent after 
inclusion of worker characteristics and to 2 percent after inclusion of both worker and 
firm characteristics. Corresponding figures from the firm level analysis were 20, 12 
and 11 percent. Moreover, there is no difference in wages between employees in 
foreign-owned firms and in domestically-owned multinational firms. Hence, our 
  13previous conclusion remains: multinational status is more important for wages than 
the nationality of the firm.
10  
One explanation for the different results between firm- level and individual-
level based estimations might stem from the correlation between firm size and 
multinationality.
11 Large firms tend to be multinationals and Swedish and foreign 
owned multinationals have been shown to pay similar wages. We test this hypothesis 
by way of estimating employment-weighted firm-level regressions. Analogously, in 
the individual wage regressions we down-weight firms by the inverse of firm size.
12  
The weighting brings the firm- and individual level regression results somewhat 
closer to each other, but they remain significantly different.
13  
Note also that by estimating individual level regressions we escape wage 
effects caused by changes in the labor force composition. This could arise if foreign 
firms replace less productive (low wage) workers with more skilled (high-wage) 
workers. In this case the estimated foreign ownership premium is a composition effect 
rather than an effect of ownership. 
Looking at the other coefficients suggest that female wages are about 14 
percent lower than male wages and that blue-collar workers have about 11 percent 
lower wages than white-collar workers. Moreover, wages and experience follow the 
classical inverted U-shaped pattern. Regarding firm characteristics, it is seen that 
capital intensity has an economically significant effect on wages; size, profits, and the 
                                                           
10 Lipsey (2004) argues that the comparison of foreign- and domestically owned MNEs might be biased 
since the latter group includes headquarter services, with comparable high wages. It is likely that at 
least some of this bias is controlled for by our relatively detailed information on worker characteristics. 
11 The different results are not caused by different time periods. Running the firm-level regressions for 
the period 1996-2000 did not upset results. 
12 Weighting of firm-level model 4 in Table 2 decreased the estimated foreign ownership wage 
premium from 12 to roughly 7 percent. Analogously, in the individual wage regressions the estimated 
foreign wage premium in model 3 in Table 4 increased from 2 to 5 percent. These results are available 
on request. 
  14average skill level of workers are statistically significant but with small coefficients.
14 
To take into account that observations might be correlated within firms, we have re-
estimated all equations, controlling for within-firm error correlations. This did not 
upset the significance of our results.
15  
  
Individual wages, mergers and acquisitions 
In the previous section we analyzed differences between foreign- and domestically 
owned firms. If there is a positive effect of foreign ownership on the wages received 
by individual workers, we expect this to show up in an analysis of foreign 
acquisitions. However, we would not expect any effect of foreign acquisitions if it is 
unobserved attributes of the workers that cause their higher wages. Moreover, foreign 
acquisitions may be non-random. For instance, high wage firms may be acquired 
more frequently than low wage firms. This suggests that matching techniques may 
improve the estimates. Table 5 presents results on both our matched and unmatched 
sample.  
 
-Table 5 about here.- 
 
Results from model 1 and 2 in Table 5 suggest a wage premium in acquired 
firms comparable with the wage premium obtained for the whole stock of foreign 
owned firms. Columns 4-6 present results from estimating models on the matched 
sample of similar firms that remain domestically owned. Taking selection bias into 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 Similar result are found in both the firm size and the rent sharing literature where the estimated effect 
of firm size and profits on wages are significantly reduced when changing from firm- to individual 
level estimations (see e.g. Oi and Idson (1999) and Arai (2003) and references therein). 
14 The average skill level of employees aims at capturing complementarities with individual wages. 
Individual wages can for instance be positively correlated with the share of high skilled workers in the 
firms through externalities. 
  15account, the estimated impact of foreign ownership becomes virtually zero, indicating 
that for individual workers there is no foreign wage premium.  
However, the wage premium may not be determined by observables only, 
unobservables may also matter. In model 3 and 6 we control for unobservables by 
estimating fixed-effect models. Since we have restricted the sample to workers 
remaining in the same firm the entire period of observation of the firm, we obtain 
within individual and within firm estimates. This means that we control for both time 
invariant individual- and firm-specific effects, thus accounting for a systematic sorting 
of individuals across firms. The inclusion of fixed-effects has a large impact on the 
foreign ownership wage premium. This is especially true for the unmatched sample 
where the fixed-effect estimation reduces the wage premium from two to minus four 
percent. Finally, in column 6 we estimate a fixed-effect model on our matched 
sample, taking into account both the issue of unobservables and selection bias. This 
results in a reduction of the estimated coefficient on foreign acquisition from minus 
four percent to minus two percent.  
To see whether it is the “shake-out” that typically occurs after an acquisition 
or ownership that drives the results we also looked at foreign firms that become 
Swedish owned. Estimating the same full model specification as in column 2, Table 5, 
the estimated impact of becoming Swedish owned is slightly negative. This suggests 
that the impact of foreign and domestic acquisitions differs.
16
To visualize how wages evolve after an acquisition we depict wage trajectories 
for acquired and non-acquired firms (see Figure 2). Figure 2 indicate that foreign 
owners target high-wage firms and that the wage actually decreases (increases but at a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Available on request. 
16 Results available on request. 
  16lower rate) after the change in ownership. This is visualized by converging wage 
trajectories of acquired and non-acquired firms.
17
 
-Figure 2 about here- 
 
We now proceed to study wage dynamics for individuals in acquired and non-
acquired firms by means of combining matching and difference-in-difference 
techniques. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) show that such combining of matching 
techniques with difference-in-difference techniques may improve non-experimental 
evaluation results significantly. As described in the Empirical Set-Up, the purpose of 
the matching procedure is to take into account the endogeneity of foreign acquisitions 
and possible selection bias. Combining matching with difference-in-difference 
analysis allows us to follow the wage dynamics over time, comparing wage growth 
between acquired and non-acquired control firms over time.  
Results from the difference-in-difference regressions are presented in Table 6. 
The growth rate of wages in targeted firms one respectively two years after 
acquisition is compared to the year prior to acquisition.
18
 
-Table 6 about here- 
 
Results verify the picture given in Figure 2. Firstly, the wage level is 2-6 
percent higher in acquired firms than in the group of matched non-acquired firms. 
Secondly, the wage growth in acquired firms is lower than in firms that do not 
                                                           
17 Acquisitions at time t occur in 1997 or 1998. Wages in non-acquired firms at time t is defined as 
average wages in non-acquired firms for the period 1997-1998. For subsequent periods we calculate a 
moving average. 
18 These effects refer to (t+1) –  (t-1) and (t+2) –  (t-1) in Table 6. 
  17become foreign owned. More specifically, the variable Foreign captures the wage 
difference between individuals in firms that are taken over by foreign owners and 
individuals in firms that remain domestically owned. The coefficients suggest that 
individuals in takeovers have a wage level that is about 2-6 percent higher than 
individuals in other firms depending on specification. However, the wage growth is 
higher in non-takeovers, as seen from the variable foreign takeover. The estimated 
coefficient, examining both the effect t+1 and t+2, suggests that wages grow slower 
for individuals in firms taken over by foreign owners compared to wages for 
individuals in other firms. This effect is stronger after two years than after one year 
(compare columns 3 and 6). 
  The results from our analysis suggest that a large share of observed differences 
in wages between foreign and domestic firms can be attributed to differences in 
observable and unobservable characteristics of firms and workers. Foreign firms do 
not seem to pay higher wages than domestic firms do for identical types of workers.  
  
V. Concluding Remarks 
We have in this paper examined the effect of ownership on wages. More precisely, we 
have used a large matched employer-employee data set to address the question of 
whether foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than domestically owned firms and 
whether foreign-owned firms pay higher wages for identical workers? The first 
question can without any doubt be answered positively: foreign-owned firms pay 
higher wages than domestically-owned firms. However, there is no evidence that 
foreign firms pay higher wages for identical workers. Instead, higher wages in 
foreign-owned firms are caused by differences in firm and worker characteristics. In 
  18this respect, worker characteristics is found to be more important than firm 
characteristics in estimating the foreign ownership wage premium. 
Results suggest that it is the difference between multinational and non-
multinational firms, rather than between domestic- and foreign-owned firms, that is 
important. Foreign-owned firms tend to pay higher wages than domestically-owned 
firms without foreign affiliates, but do not pay higher wages than domestically-owned 
multinational firms.  
We also find a large difference in results between firm-level and individual-
level data. Firm level results tend to overestimate the wage premium in foreign-owned 
firms, presumably because foreign- and domestically-owned firms are distributed 
differently over size categories. Firm-level results might therefore be biased by a 
comparison of, on average, relatively large foreign-owned firms with relatively small 
non-multinational domestically-owned firms. 
We also investigated how the mode of entry affects wages. Foreign owned 
firms might enter the market by a greenfield investment or through acquisition of a 
Swedish owned firm. We therefore compare foreign greenfield investments with 
foreign acquisitions. The results suggest that in order to attract new workers 
greenfield investors have to pay a wage premium.  
To deal with the issue of unobservables and selection bias in foreign 
acquisitions, we combine matching techniques with difference in differences 
estimations. Results suggest that foreign owners target high-wage firms and that, 
compared to non-targeted firms, wages increase at a lower rate after the change in 
ownership. Hence, for an individual worker, if anything, the change in ownership 
implies a less positive wage growth. 
  19Our result has some important implications. Firstly, previous firm-level 
studies on ownership and wages presumably exaggerate the foreign wage premium. 
Secondly, our results show that it is important to control for worker heterogeneity and 
for selection bias in foreign acquisitions. Controlling for these factors yield results 
indicating no systematic differences in wages between domestic and foreign-owned 
firms. Finally, our results suggest that it is important to focus on the difference 
between multinational and non-multinational firms, rather than comparing foreign- 
and domestically owned firms.  
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 1990 2000  1990  2000  1990 2000 
Total  1.18  1.21  2.02  1.72 1.28 1.59 
           
Simple manufacturing (1)   1.04  1.21  2.12  1.70  1.30  3.52 
Wood and metals        (2)  1.10  1.12  2.49  1.77  2.38  2.11 
Electronics,transp. eq. (3)  1.19  0.85  2.94  1.58  1.95  1.28 
Energy                         (4)  1.13  1.04  2.19  1.42  1.76  0.96 
Retail trade                  (5)  1.34  1.43  4.27  3.12  1.04  1.31 
Transport serv.            (6)  1.08  1.16  1.37  3.01  0.70  1.31 
Real estate                   (7)  1.08  1.25  0.88  1.10  0.86  2.01 
Note: Share of skilled employees is constructed as the share of employees with at least 
tertiary education. 
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Table 2. The effect of foreign ownership on wages. Firm-level estimates 1990-2000 
(dependent variable – log wage per employee).    
 

































































































































































































































Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at a 
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Table 3. The effect of greenfields and foreign takeovers on wages. Firm-level estimates 
1990-2000 (dependent variable – log wage per employee).    
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Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at a 









  25Table 4. The effect of foreign ownership on wages. Individual level  
estimates 1996-2000 (dependent variable – log monthly wage). 
 







































































































































































































Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a ten percent level;  ** - significant 
at a five percent level; *** - significant at a one percent level. Industry dummies 


















           
  26Table 5. Wage effects of foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. Individual level  
estimates 1996-2000 (dependent variable – log monthly wage). 
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Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at a 
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 Figure 2. Wage growth for individuals in firms that are acquired by a 























  28Table 6. Wage effects of foreign takeovers of Swedish firms – difference in 
difference estimations on the matched sample 1996-2000 (dependent variable – log 
monthly wage). 
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Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at a 
five percent level; *** - significant at a one percent level. Industry dummies correspond to 14 
industries. (t+1) – (t-1) refers to the difference between one year after foreign takeover compared to 
one year prior to takeover. (t+2) – (t-1) corresponds to the effect two years after foreign takeover. 
  
  29Appendix 
Table A1. Variables. 
 
Firm variables    
Wage  Average wage compensation per employee, including 
payroll tax. 1990 years prices. 
FS 
Profits  Profit, net of financial deduction, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Capital Intensity  Capital stock per employee, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Export share  (Export/sales)*100  FS 
Labor productivity  Deflated value added per employee, 1990 year prices  FS 
High  Skilled  Share of labor force with at least 3 years post-
secondary education. 
RAMS 
Medium skilled  Share of labor force with 1-2 years of post secondary 
education. 
RAMS 
Low Skilled  Share of labor force with at most 9 years elementary 
education. 
RAMS 
Foreign ownership  Dummy=1 if more than 50 percent of a firm’s votes 
is foreign owned. 
FS 
Size  Number of employees  FS 
Female-share  Share of female employees  RAMS 
    
Individual variables    
Wage  Full time equivalent monthly wage per employee, 
1990 year prices. 
LS 
Female  Dummy = 1 if female  LS 
Blue-collar  Dummy = 1 if blue-collar worker  LS 
Education dummies  Based on the Swedish education nomenclature 
(SUN-codes). 
(1). Elementary school < 9 years  
(2). Compulsory school = 9 years  
(3). Upper secondary, 2 years  
(4). Upper secondary, 3 years  
(5). Upper secondary, 4 years  
(6). Undergraduate studies, 3 years  
(7). PhD.  
LS 
Experience Age  minus  number of years of schooling.  LS 
    





























Note: Abbreviations: Financial statistics (FS), Regional labor market statistics (RAMS), Individual 
wage statistics (LS). 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics. Individual and firm characteristics. 




 Mean SD Mean SD
Individuals 1996-2000 
Log monthly wage  9.66 0.28 9.70 0.30
Female 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46
Experience 32 11 32 11
Education level: 
   Elementary School <9  0.10 0.85 0.12 1.58
   Compulsory School =9  0.12 1.04 0.14 1.42
   Upper Secondary School <3  0.39 1.43 0.33 3.12
   Upper Secondary School =3  0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38
   Upper Secondary School =4  0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33
   University undergraduate  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
   University graduate  0.01 0.07 0.01 0.09
   Blue collar  0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50
Number of observations  1,317,275  296,897 
    
Firms 1990-2000    
Profits/Employee 111.5  2651  101.8 448
High skilled  5.82  11.2  10.5 12.0
Medium skilled  53.6  14.4  51.1 12.7
Low skilled  30.3  16.2  22.6 14.4
Female share  0.30  0.24  0.31 0.18
Log firm size  4.10  0.96  4.64 1.07
Export share  7.56  20.0  20.81 29.5
Labor productivity  1471  2610  2449 3860
Number of observations  53587  7979 
 
Table A3. Propensity Score matching. 1:st step logit model. 
Dependent variable is Foreign ownership. 
 
   1997  1998 
 
Log investments over sales 
 




Log firm size 
 





























































Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a 10 percent level; ** - significant at a 
five percent level; *** - significant at a one percent level. All explanatory variables are lagged one 
year. The 1997 specification also include share of medium skilled employees, while for 1998 we also 
included (Profits/sales)
2, (log firm size)
3 and (log firm size)
2.  See Section III for information on how 
the matching procedure was implemented. 
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